Issues in the Acquisition, Development, and Use of Technology in Health Care by Lanzafame, Raymond J.
Issues in the Acquisition, Development, and Use of
Technology in Health Care
Raymond J. Lanzafame, MD
SLS President 2006
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members
of this Society for the privilege of serving as your presi-
dent over this past year. Indeed the words of Joseph
Heller ring true: “How did I get there? Somebody pushed
me. Somebody must have set me off in this direction and
clusters of other hands must have touched themselves to
the controls at various times.”
I am deeply honored and humbled to follow in the foot-
steps of true giants in minimally invasive surgery and to
work with a group of extremely talented people. I would
also like to take the opportunity to thank Janice and Paul
Wetter for their tireless support, their innovativeness, and
for being the true force behind SLS. These sentiments are
not solely my own. They echo the sentiments of the entire
board of directors who presented Janice and Paul with a
Steuben glass apple as a small token of our appreciation at
our recent strategic planning meeting in Boulder, Colo-
rado. An organization is only as good as its leadership,
and SLS is blessed to have an extremely capable and
forward-thinking board of directors who have provided
guidance and leadership as well as friendship over the
many years of my association with this organization.
My topic today will investigate some of the issues con-
cerning the interface of medicine with medical economics,
business, science, and technology. There are many vari-
ables and changes on the horizon, and it is clear that we
must embark on a path to understand the issues that affect
our patients and ourselves.
We must first understand some of the bare facts about
healthcare economics in this country. Healthcare spend-
ing is increasing at a rate of 9.3% per year, while the rate
of economic growth is only 3.6%.
1–9 Putting this into real
terms, healthcare spending represented 5.3% of the gross
domestic product (GDP) in 1960 at $27 million.
1–9 By
1980, it represented 9.5% of the gross domestic product at
$240 billion and was 12% of the GDP in 1990 at $755
billion.
1–9 By 2005, healthcare expenditures increased to
16% of the GDP at $1.6 trillion.
1–5 The overall cost of
healthcare doubled from 1993 to 2004.
1–9 Current esti-
mates are that healthcare spending will be $2.2 trillion
dollars in 2008 and will reach 25% of the GDP by 2030.
1–9
These figures mean that changes in healthcare and health-
care expenditures are critical issues for multiple constitu-
encies, who in aggregate represent one seventh of our
country’s gross domestic product.
2,3,5,7 It also means that
changes are more difficult to make given the multiple
groups that are potentially impacted in the process.
Currently, there are 41 million Medicare beneficiaries and
another 47 million on Medicaid. Medicare expenditures
increased 30-fold from $7.7 billion to $224.4 billion as the
number of beneficiaries expanded from 26 million to 38.6
million between 1970 and 2000.
2,3,7 Seventeen percent of
the current United States population is beyond the age of
65.
2 That number will increase to 25% of the population
by the year 2020.
2,7–9 Even more staggering is the fact that
there are 77 million baby boomers, individuals born be-
tween 1946 and 1964, who will begin to be eligible for
Medicare in 2010.
2,7–9 This has been labeled by some as a
“medical tsunami” that will further strain our economic
and medical resources. Health-care expenditures are also
impacted by the general tendency of patients to ignore
their physician’s advice or to defer acting upon it for as
long as is possible.
11,12
At the same time, there are more than 12,000 insurance
carriers in addition to Medicare and Medicaid in this coun-
try. In the period between 1970 and 1995, the number of
physicians in the United States increased by about 25%.
2,3
The number of administrators increased by more than
2000% over that same period.
2,3 Currently, administrative
costs represent 24% to 30% of annual U.S. health expen-
ditures.
2,3,7
On the administrative side, insurance company CEO sal-
aries range from $1 million to more than $7 million with
options as high as $95 million.
2,3,7 The incomes of the top
for-profit hospital corporations range from $145 million to
over $21 billion, and their profits range from $12 million to
$1.3 billion.
2,3,7 The salaries for CEOs in the for-profit
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2,3,7
Physicians are increasingly being asked to jump through
more and higher hoops as the public, industry, and gov-
ernment demand more information, more data driven
outcomes and increase in healthcare quality.
12–29 Several
initiatives including Pay for Performance (P4P), Leapfrog,
the Surgical Care Quality Improvement Project (SCQIP),
and others are directed at some of these.
10,17,24,26
Many in healthcare see these changing times as being as
bleak and as fleeting as shifting sands in the desert. Others
see new opportunities, particularly in the cosmetic and
fee-for-service sectors.
28–32 For example, several devices
including lasers, ultrasound, spa treatments, and other
therapies are aggressively marketed across a broad range
of medical and allied health disciplines to boost the bot-
tom line. Practitioners are offering services that are paid
for by an increasingly willing population of baby
boomers, who have the means to afford them and the
unwillingness to show their age.
Several opportunities for the future require us to think
outside of the box as we manage the balance between
rising practice costs, declining reimbursement, and the
need to keep pace with technology. Some view medical
technology as both a solution and a problem in the mix of
health-care delivery, particularly at the hospital level. Eric
Cassell
33 stated:
. . .[I]f there’s one thing that can be singled out as the
engine of medical economic inflation now occurring
everywhere in the world, it is the seemingly irresistible
spread of technology into every level of medicine irre-
sistible to doctors, patients, and nations alike.
In fact, we are enamored with technology, but there are
those who would say that we should not be tempted.
Cassell
33 further admonishes:
Doctors who have mastered a technology tend to use it
as often as possible not necessarily for reasons of profit,
but because they love their skills and technologies. . . .
Problems tend to be redefined so that a technology
becomes appropriate when it might otherwise not be
. . . . It is also used where it is inappropriate, defined by
the capabilities of the technology and the consequent
expertise of physicians rather than—or even contrary
to—the good of the sick person.
Still others are concerned about the substitution of tech-
nology for the surgeon or the presumption that technol-
ogy will solve all of our ills. Such sentiments are echoed in
the words of the late Claude Organ
6:
In today’s environment, we are surrounded by ma-
chines that have become substitutes for common sense
and reason. With increasing frequency, attempts are
being made to substitute technology for the surgeon. . . .
This is the fault of the surgeon not of technology. This
has diminished our profession as a cognitive discipline.
In short, we have become technology addicts.
The hospital feels caught between the costs of new tech-
nology and returns on the investment for these new tech-
nologies from their perspective. Elizabeth Gardner ana-
lyzed this situation recently from the vantage of the
institution.
34 The basic thesis of her article is that high
price tags for state-of-the-art surgical equipment have hos-
pitals attempting to decide when or even whether they
should invest in technology. Examples provided range
from the $100,000 to $500,000 cost to outfit a basic mini-
mally invasive surgical suite or acquire instrumentation for
image-guided surgery for otolaryngology, versus the $1.3
million cost of a Da Vinci surgical robot or the $5.3 million
cost of an intraoperative MRI for neurosurgery. The article
points out that “extras” for these investments include the
variable costs for disposables, which can be significant,
depending on the specific procedures performed, and the
substantial maintenance and upgrade requirements,
which, in the case of Da Vinci, is $100,000 annually. So the
questions for the institution are shall we invest in this new
technology, do we want to be ahead of the curve, or do
we want to follow the pack after the technology has been
refined and is more stable and, we hope, less expensive?
Technology is indeed changing rapidly as it moves from
large mainframe computers to PDAs, other digital devices,
from large robots like Da Vinci to smaller devices such as
the Peine
35 and even mini-robots as have been reported
recently, and that have been used investigationally in
“standard” and N.O.T.E.S. type procedures.
36 However, it
is a great technologic leap from concept to commercial
product, and that transition often involves basic and clin-
ical research in addition to a good business plan. Money
must be gathered, intellectual property must be protected,
and the technology must be approved for clinical use.
Let us examine some of the details of healthcare research
spending that drives technological development. Biomed-
ical research funding increased from $37.1 billion in 1994
to $94.3 billion in 2003.
37 Research spending doubled
during this period when it is adjusted for inflation. Over
$95 billion was spent on medical research in 2005.
37 This
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expenditures on biomedical research.
37 The breakdown
of spending demonstrates that 99 cents of every research
dollar was spent on new drugs and medical devices, while
only 1 cent of each research dollar was spent on health
services research.
1 NIH funding was $26.4 billion in 2003,
which was 28% of the total expenditure, and industry
support was $54.1 billion or 57% in 2003.
37 Not only did
funding double between 1994 and 2003, but the largest
increases in funding occurred in the devices, biotechnol-
ogy, and pharmaceutical firm support sectors, as well as
funding through the NIH.
37 Private funding, state and
local government financing, and other federal support
remained relatively constant over the same period.
37 The
cumulative stock market return of publicly traded life
science companies generally performed at or above the
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index between 1994 and 2003.
37
There are many new technologies on the horizon that will
take us to new heights, but we should also understand
that there are aspects of healthcare economics that do not
fit the standard free market microeconomic analysis of
supply and demand. Microeconomic theory states that
there is an optimum price and quantity where there are
equal numbers of satisfied buyers and sellers in the sys-
tem.
38 It is important to understand that cost does not
equal charge in healthcare.
39 Charge does not equal re-
imbursement. Reimbursement does not equal global cost,
and the concept of global cost for the insurance carrier is
different from the concept of global cost for an employer.
The global cost for an employer or industry is different
from the global cost to society.
30–32,38,39
The perspective of the individual patient relative to the
cost of care differs from that of the other stakeholders. The
patient places the greatest value on the procedure or
treatment that will solve the problem with the least dis-
comfort, the least scarring, and the least disability. Patients
often equate high technology with being the “best”
option, and demand the “latest” advance for their
care.
13–16,29–32,39 Most patients have very little connection
with the true economic costs of their treatment. Much of
the cost of care is borne by third parties, even in cases of
rising deductibles and copayments.
These differing perspectives on cost versus benefit are
illustrated by the following examples. The case of the Ford
Pinto demonstrates the concept of cost to the individual
versus the cost to industry.
40,41 Ford developed the Pinto
to sell at a price of less than $2,000 and was to produce the
vehicle at a street weight of less than 2,000 pounds. The
assembly line had already been tooled when it became
apparent that the fuel tank was defective. A cost benefit
analysis was performed. It was estimated that the defects
could be corrected at a cost of $11 per vehicle. It was
estimated that there would be 2,100 burned vehicles, 180
burn deaths, and 180 serious burn injuries if the defects
were not corrected. This would cost approximately
$200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, and $700 reim-
bursement for each destroyed vehicle. The total payments
for these damages would result in an expenditure of $49.5
million. The costs to fix the defects were estimated at $137
million based on sales of 11 million cars and 1.5 million
light trucks at a cost of $11 per vehicle sold. The execu-
tives ultimately placed a dollar value on human life and
successfully argued that it was not cost effective or prof-
itable to repair the defects. They argued that it was con-
siderably less expensive to pay the costs incurred by
exploding gas tanks.
40,41 Similarly, GM was fined $4.9
billion for defective gas tanks in the 1979 Chevy Malibu,
which could have been corrected at a cost of $8.59 per
vehicle.
42 The take home lesson is that even in an industry
where costs can be passed on directly to the consumer,
the business decision is out of sync with the best interest
of the individual or the public.
A recent medical example is drug-eluting stents.
43–48 The
development of stent technology has improved and ex-
panded the utility and the efficacy of percutaneous coro-
nary angioplasty. Bare stents cost about $1000 per unit.
Drug-eluting stents cost between $2,500 and $3,500 each,
and an average of 1.43 stents are implanted per case.
47
The DRG payments increase by about $1,800 when drug-
eluting stent codes are billed.
47 The rate of restenosis
drops from 30% to less than 9%.
44,47 There is a 10%
reduction in surgical volume due to fewer coronary by-
pass procedures being performed.
47 At the same time,
there is a 50% reduction in interventions necessitated by
coronary restenosis.
47 It was estimated that Beaumont
Hospital would lose $3.8 million if drug-eluting stents
(DES) were used in 50% of angioplasty cases and that a
greater proportionate loss would occur with higher rates
of use.
47 Hospitals see less revenue generation and enor-
mous increases in their supply costs with DES use. Pa-
tients and insurance companies benefit by having fewer
repeat interventions and fewer CABG procedures. How-
ever, hospitals, insurance companies, and thoracic sur-
geons call into question whether the technology is truly
cost effective.
44,46–48 Indeed the role of DES technology is
being hotly debated in the literature, including attempts to
define the specific circumstances where the stents are
clearly beneficial.
46–48 There is increasing pressure from
patients to have the latest drug-eluting technology im-
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plications occur if bare stents are used, are willingly com-
plying.
43–48 It is clear that health care issues are often
complex and require careful consideration.
How should a hospital respond to pressures to acquire
new technology?
49–52 Most healthcare costs are fixed and
sunk over any reasonable time horizon.
51 Fixed costs do
not vary with the level of patient activity, and once sunk
they cannot be easily reversed.
51 Once dollars have been
invested to acquire a technology, the more frequently it is
used, the less expensive its per case cost will be. This is
demonstrated in the example of the acquisition of a
$100,000 machine. If that $100,000 machine is used only
once in 10 years, it costs $100,000 per case to use it. Using
that same machine a thousand times a year for each of 10
years, the cost per case is reduced to $10. Of course, the
variable costs for any disposable items used with the
machine would be the same per case. This is a strong
argument for encouraging the use of a technology once it
has been acquired.
51–54
Many of the least expensive, quickest, and highest return
reforms in health care are process rather than technology
related.
51,53 We must understand that managed care orga-
nizations focus on the variable cost of health care delivery
and largely neglect capacity decisions. However, for the
hospital at the extreme of excess capacity, there is little
disincentive to do additional cases, and at reduced capac-
ity there are incentives to increase throughput to increase
volume. This is so because resource consumption in
healthcare is front-loaded with most of the expenses be-
ing incurred on the first day of a patient’s stay. Reducing
length of stay is important in cases of high-capacity utili-
zation, because it frees up capacity and creates opportu-
nities for more admissions. There is very little incentive to
reduce length of stay under conditions at the extreme of
low utilization of capacity. It is estimated that the last day
of a hospital stay contributes approximately 3% to the cost
of care.
14,51–56
What is the impact of the clinician on costs? Individual
surgeons have statistically and clinically significant differ-
ences in their costs and volatility of costs when holding
patient factors and procedural complexity constant.
55–63
Even surgeons who see similar case mixes can have very
different ranges of cost as they treat their patients.
55,57
There is also a dichotomy between what payers pay in
professional fees to doctors and what they pay to the
hospital.
55–57 The interaction between the amount of OR
time used, the RVUs per case, and the number of cases
performed per year determine the contribution to the
hospital margin by any particular surgeon or surgical ser-
vice.
55–57 The choice of technologies used and the use of
disposables rather than reusable instruments can ad-
versely affect the hospital’s margin.
4,55–57 Such choices
can very quickly transform a modestly profitable or break
even procedure into an economic loser for the hospi-
tal.
4,55–57 However, the surgeon is still reimbursed at the
usual and customary fee for the procedure.
There are many other threats that need to be considered in
the changing healthcare environment. There is a trend on
the part of the federal government to mandate more trans-
parency relative to CMS payments to hospitals, ambula-
tory care centers, and providers.
11,16,20–25,53,59 This is
viewed as a way of providing consumers with cost infor-
mation in an effort to encourage them to choose the least
expensive alternative.
24,26,53 However, it is unclear how
the public will respond to this information.
One survey found that 76% of the public believes that the
convenience of a hospital is more important than hospital
quality.
53 At the same time, 70% of the public do not trust
their employers’ choice of health insurance.
53 Patients are
ill equipped to make decisions on quality of care. They
use word of mouth or service and customer satisfaction
attributes as the primary basis when making their health-
care choices, because they cannot evaluate expertise or
quality effectively.
59–67The convenience factor is helping
to fuel point-of-service health-care opportunities at retail
locations including pharmacies, department stores, and
shopping malls.
67 Patients are willing to trade conve-
nience and speed of access for more comprehensive or
ongoing care. It is likely that this trend will continue in the
future. It is truly unknown, however, to what degree an
individual patient will make decisions based on the
cheapest price, particularly because economic responsi-
bility for healthcare is limited at best for most patients.
Quality Surgical Solutions, a quality initiative in the State
of Kentucky, found that there was no single clinical situ-
ation in which safer practices were intrinsically more ex-
pensive than those that were less safe in 6 years of study.
53
Similarly, they found no instances where practices that are
more expensive were associated with better outcomes.
53
The negative effects of reports of medical error and post-
operative deaths for individual hospitals more than offset
the recognized value of volume or accreditation, regard-
less of whether they were a teaching hospital or were
rated as the best in their local area.
53
What scientific breakthroughs and technologic innova-
tions will be developed, and how will they affect health-
care in the future? Technology and innovation are vital
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and accelerating change. They are juxtaposed with in-
creasing social pressures relative to healthcare and sci-
ence funding.
6,13,15,16,18,27–34,37,49,50,55,56,63 The pace of in-
novation truly staggers the imagination. Many innovative
products never make it to the market or fail when they are
introduced. Discontinuous product innovations may not
have a perceived use or benefit when they are first intro-
duced.
29–34,37,38,49,50,63
Consider the development of the Argon Beam Coagula-
tor.
68–70 Patents in 1969 and in the 1970s described the
development of a plasma arc scalpel that could be used to
both cut and coagulate tissue.
69–70 Sales and marketing
experts in the companies developing the device for clin-
ical use transformed the concept from a device that could
both cut and coagulate tissues to a device used solely for
coagulation. The technology used in both open and lapa-
roscopic procedures today bears little resemblance to the
original concept.
Technology has made some important advances, but the
leaps from product development to channel distribution
and return on investment are important considerations
from the business perspective.
49,50,63 These factors deter-
mine whether a promising idea will ultimately find its way
to clinical practice. Declining revenues in health-care seg-
ments and the fact that the technology is negatively im-
pacted by regulation and that FDA approval is necessary
for the use of drugs and devices are additional drivers in
the medical environment. The FDA approval process can
significantly impact the decision to develop a technolo-
gy.
13–16,29–32 Those who are the first to market products
can incur substantial expenses in gaining approval via the
PMA process (premarket approval), while subsequent
competitors can more rapidly market their products using
the 510k process (substantial equivalence to an already
approved device). Steven Wright’s quip “[t]he early bird
gets the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese” is
fitting in this environment.
It is also important for us to understand the fickle nature
and changeability of medical opinion. Consider laparo-
scopic cholecystectomy.
29–32 “Lap chole” has an anatom-
ically identical result to that of open cholecystectomy. It
was not recognized as a standard of care and was consid-
ered “experimental” by insurers and academics alike in
1989. However, by 1994, it accounted for approximately
90% of elective cholecystectomies and was recognized as
the “standard of care.”
16,39 It is estimated that approxi-
mately 75% of all cholecystectomies performed in the
United States today are completed laparoscopically.
Change in opinion is not unique to lap chole.
Consider arthroscopy, flexible endoscopy, and laparo-
scopic surgery in general. Each technique was initially
spurned by the mainstream medical and surgical commu-
nities. In each instance, pressure from patients and com-
petition between surgeons and facilities drove market
penetration acceptance of these techniques. Payers were
concerned that unnecessary procedures would be per-
formed. However, these fears have not been realized as
we have migrated from open to less invasive procedures.
The transformation has been so complete in the case of
lap chole that we are currently concerned that present day
trainees are ill prepared to perform open cholecystec-
tomy.
Laparoscopic appendectomy is also increasing in fre-
quency. I am sure for most in this audience “lap appy” is
viewed favorably despite equivocal reviews by the Co-
chrane Collaboration and the surgical mainstream.
16 The
improved ability to visualize the appendix and to perform
a diagnostic laparoscopy no doubt helps to drive this
phenomenon. Another area of controversy is the debate
over laparoscopic versus open herniorrhaphy, which is
being eclipsed by recent literature that questions the need
for herniorrhaphy in general.
71
There are also compelling arguments for surgical rather
than medical management in some cases. This includes a
growing literature demonstrating that laparoscopic Nissen
fundoplication is more cost-effective than nonsurgical
therapies in the management of GERDs and hiatus her-
nia.
16,32,44 Yet H2 blockers and PPIs continue to be pre-
scribed for the long-term management of these condi-
tions.
It becomes incumbent upon us to continue to critically
review and question the literature. We should recognize
that inappropriate questions will result in erroneous con-
clusions. For example, if the anatomic outcome in the
intraoperative conduct of a laparoscopic procedure is
identical to its open counterpart, it is reasonable to pre-
sume that the so-called long-term outcome for both will
be identical. To state it another way, the long-term out-
come of removal of the appendix should be identical
irrespective of whether the procedure is performed as an
open or a laparoscopic procedure. Comparisons of out-
comes in such cases should be limited to short-term is-
sues, such as morbidity, mortality, length of stay, and
disability defined as return to unrestricted activity. How-
ever, it is not appropriate to conclude that laparoscopic
JSLS (2006)10:401–408 405appendectomy has no value because its long-term out-
come is the same as that of the open procedure.
We should refrain from overinterpreting learning curve
results and should not assume that they are reflective of a
procedure’s duration, utility, or cost ad infinitum. Our
literature is unfortunately replete with examples that pit
the early experience using a new technique or technology
against the career-long experience of the surgical expert.
Rhetoric from the untrained or poorly trained should not
be confused with an actual scientific investigation. We
must continue to discuss, share, and dialogue with our
colleagues about the risks, the benefits, the alternatives,
and the limits of our techniques and technologies.
In conclusion, medicine and healthcare are changing rap-
idly. There are many threats and opportunities in our
changing healthcare environment. Aging baby boomers
and the use of new technology are impacting our ability to
provide appropriate care at a reasonable cost. Consumers
and other stakeholders are demanding more information
and more accountability from providers. Consumers con-
tinue to base their decisions on service and satisfaction
because they cannot evaluate technical skills. Multiple
forces will continue to drive the minimally invasive surgi-
cal revolution into the foreseeable future. We must use
technology responsibly and honestly evaluate our out-
comes. It is our responsibility to educate our patients,
ourselves, and our colleagues about the benefits and lim-
its of minimally invasive surgery.
I would like to thank you for your attention and for the
honor and privilege of serving as your president.
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